Why do you need the 192.168.1.1 IP Address?
In TCP/IP networks every active element (router) must have its own network IP (the standard is 192.168.1.1) address. Allocation of addresses is one of the basic steps in configuring the local network. You can find more info about the IP in generall here.
How to use it in your advantage?
Utilizing the IP address 192.168.1.1 ( or any other IP: 192.168.2.1, 192.168.1.254) is really a simple approach to set up your router. For most cutting edge home routers, you can simply type it in to your web browser. And a login page will come up.
What it will look like will depend on the manufacturer. Some may require a username and a router password to see the settings, others will just show a message if you are connected to the internet. If you can not log in to your router via the web browser you have some options to check, if the connections is on and stable. (Sometimes somebody just plugs the internet cable out) Do not worry that you can break something. You likely need to sign in, to do any genuine damage, however.
How to login to your router using the 192.168.l.l IP?
- Enter the IP of your router to your web browser
- To access the router settings, use your Internet browser. No matter which one you use (Google Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Safari..). The only thing you need is the IP address of the router. This is typically in the shape of “192.168.0.1“
- Copy the address or type it in a web browser. To access the router settings, you will be asked to enter your login and password. It is either printed directly on the router, or on its manual. Often it is a combination of login: admin and password: admin. Then just click on log in and you are in the admin settings.
The next page should like something like this:
What if I can not log in using the 192.168.1.1 IP Address?
There are many problems you can encounter. The first thing is to try to ping the router. If you do not know what is you can have a look at what is ping. Now we need to test the ping. You can do it with this ping test.
Private IP addresses for private networks
The private LAN is necessary to assign IP addresses which fall within a specific range of IP addresses reserved for private networks. These addresses are not used anywhere on the internet. It is assumed that it is always the address of any computer on the local/private network. Routers are adjusted so that the IP addresses that fall within the range of private IP addresses on the Internet do not look for (192.168.l.l address on the internet is not permitted – always looking on the internal network) IP addresses outside the range specified for private networks are considered to addresses used by computers on the Internet (www.google.com has an address 220.127.116.11, this address is the address of a computer located on the Internet).
What is a router?
The router is used for routing the data streams, and ultimately to distribute an Internet connection to terminal equipment. Practically this is a relatively small rectangular box. On the front you can find a classic indicator lights – ON, WiFi internet connected socket for UTP cable. On the back are then several connections to the network (UTP) cables – labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, internet connection – labeled WAN or Internet, the power off button and the power connector. Very often the router is connected to the modem and it is drought and complex device that produces the signal from the phone line, processes it and distributed it subsequently to individual computers.
How to discover your router IP address?
Press the key combination Win + R. In the text box, and type cmd. Now in the command prompt, type “ipconfig”. The search item is the default gateway (eg. 192.168.l.l).
UNIX and Linux
Just open the Terminal. This depends on your Linux distribution, it can be anywhere from the top and also in the menu items, or at the bottom of the screen. Just click Applications – System tools – Terminal.
Type the following when the terminal opens:
ip route | grep default
Then you should get something like this:
martin$ ip route | grep default
default via 192.168.l.l dev eth0 proto static
Basic setup for the 192.168.1.1
These setting usually do not need to change. It is important to choose a dynamic or static IP address. If you set dynamic, do not worry of a virtually error. However, if the instructions for connecting to your provider requires a static IP, select it. Enter the designated IP address and set the DNS servers. If you do not know what DNS servers to use, they are freely available and very often you can just use Google DNS servers (addresses: 18.104.22.168 and 22.214.171.124). Save the settings by pressing the save button. (the labeling can depend on the equipment used).
How to change your router password?
Before the finish of the settings and its confirmation you should change the password to the router administration. It should be in the basic settings tab, or find an item called Admin Password Change. Users can leave the sig in (login) – admin, but always change the password. Again, using a combination of uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers. Remember to save your settings.
What about security?
The size and use of computer networks have increased exponentially over the past two decades. For some time the network used to transmit still more sensitive information. Undermine the credibility of this information can have different consequences, the most dangerous is the loss of privacy, data theft or even legal liability. With the development of the network itself it is also related to the development of tools dedicated to security attacks. About this is also evidenced by steadily diminishing level of IT knowledge required to implement a successful network attack.
While a few years ago would normally attacker possessing specialized knowledge in networking and programming today it is thanks to these sophisticated tools required only basic knowledge in these areas.
Network security is still evolving. Because of the very nature of computer IP 192.168.l.l networks such as the persecution and accusations of criminals in this area extremely complicated matter. The attacker may not have direct contact with the victim to successfully carry out an attack, are virtually non-existent traces and evidence is often insufficient to provide an adequate level of justice in this area.
Computer networks have become an essential part of any modern technical infrastructure and our lives. We use them on an everyday basis for work and to relax, but they are also a part of critical services such as national emergency systems, army networks, financial and information services etc.
Their failure directly affects us and has consequences for our lives, economy, politics and national security. Thus, it is not surprising, that computer networks attract attackers and fraudsters trying to exploit network services to obtain money, sensitive information, damage the systems, or simply for their fun.
Security and reliability is therefore one of the key parts of any modern network infrastructure. A large number of attacks threatens computer networks nowadays, by utilizing network protocols’ design faults, incorrect software implementations, or an inappropriate users behaviour.
Although the basis of these attacks is almost similar, a lot of variants exist, differing in the used protocol, behaviour, or methods used to avoid attack detection. Every day a lot of new attacks variants emerge, which represents a challenge for network intrusion detection systems.
Almost each of these variants require fast reaction of authors of intrusion detection systems to suppress it in a time. Currently, there exist several different approaches for network anomaly detection. These approaches utilize various techniques for network data analysis from statistical to machine learning methods.
Each of these approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages that affect the success of detection of advanced network threats. Some approaches focus only on a particular type of attacks or are not able to adequately respond to new attacks forms. In our research we aim to overcome these limitations by utilizing similarity search techniques that allow us to analyse data in a similar way as a human brain does.
Millions, billions, trillions. So many and even more messages are exchanged every day between various people in the world. The Internet created a brand new way to communicate and collaborate, even if you are located on the opposite parts of the world. Since the times of Alexander Graham Bell, the accessibility to the communication devices and their simplicity have been incredibly enhanced.
Nowadays, almost 2.5 billion people in the world have access to the Internet and, therefore, they are able to use almost limitless communication possibilities it provides. However, the manner of Internet usage essentially changed during the first decade of 21st century. Using the Internet and using the web browser became almost synonymous.
People use the web browser as the primary platform to do every single task on the Internet. Sometimes it is not even possible to use the other Internet services without visiting certain web page in the web browser and performing the authentication there.1 Considering the mentioned fact, web browsers have become also the basic platform for the communication tools.
Even though the purpose of the world wide web and HTTP 192.168.l.l protocol was completely different at first (displaying single documents connected via hypertext links), it appeared that there was a need for common rich applications running within a web browser – a rich Internet application (RIA) sprang up. Such popular social networks are built on top of the web browser platform and they are used by more than a billion people in the world.
And the main reason why the social networks are so popular is the real-time stream of news and messages from other people. At the beginning of 2013, I would say that static web is dead – users prefer interactivity. As mentioned above, the web browser has become one of the most popular platforms. Celebrio, a simple software for the elderly, simulating the operating system interface, is a typical example of a rich Internet application.2 All the topics mentioned in the previous paragraph appeared to be very important in the system. When interviewing the elderly people in the Czech Republic, it appeared that almost 90 % of the elderly computer users use the real-time communication (RTC) applications, mostly Skype.
What about attacks on 192.168.1.1 ?
Increased resilience does not come for free and the involvement of neighbours opens the possibility for new attacks. The impact of, and defenses against such attacks are discussed, with respect to passive and active attackers.
A passive attacker can either randomly or selectively compromise a fraction of nodes, extract all their keys, and access the relayed communication, but the compromised nodes do not misbehave in the protocol execution.
- may try to selectively capture nodes based on the knowledge of their IDs in order to obtain most keys for its forged node ID – as described in Section 2.1.5, actual IDs of nodes distributed in the first round can be kept secret just between a node and its direct neighbours, never transmitted over a non-encrypted channel.
- will use a node with a random forged ID – based on previous analytical results, a group of nodes will have a very high probability of sharing at least one key that the attacker does not know and thus also a very high probability of detecting cheating.
- will try to generate a random forged ID, for which he knows most of the keys (for feasibility evaluation – see Section 2.3.1, Lemma 2 – results for 200 keys in a ring show that such attack is computationally infeasible even when the attacker knows 1/3 of the initial key pool.)
- will select such a position within the network so that neighbouring nodes only know the keys known to the attacker – there are the following defenses:
(a) At least minAuthKeys are required to enable the key exchange. This security parameter prohibits poorly secured exchanges.
(b) The use of a fresh random identifier instead of the original ID as described in Section 2.1.5 for selective capture of nodes above to minimize attacker knowledge about nodes in network.
- will use node(s) with same ID(s) as the captured one(s) – known as the Sybil attack. Our protocol offers no defense here, and we rely on other replication detection mechanisms.
An active attacker can not only do all that the passive attacker can, e.g. extract secrets from captured nodes, but also place them back in the field and actively control them during the protocol execution.
1. An attacker will compromise one of A’s neighbours and supply an incorrect onion key value when asked for keys causing rejection of a valid node B. After rejection of node B, A can initiate the compromise detection phase: A gradually removes onion keys from EK0 to detect when B will be able to successfully decrypt KAB, detecting the incorrect onion key supplier.
2. An attacker will compromise some node N and relay part of the protocol messages for node X with a forged ID to neighbours of node N pretending that there is an authentication process between N and X going on to obtain correct onion keys usable elsewhere. Here the following policy can be introduced as a defense: Ni will not respond to N until a ‘hello from X’ packet from the first step of the protocol is received. The random nonce Rij generated by each node prevents creation of same onion key multiple times.
3. An attacker may try to insert bogus messages impersonating some party participating in the protocol. Integrity, confidentiality and freshness of all messages from step 2 are protected by the pre-existing link secure channel. The message from step 6 is integrity protected by the key KAB. Integrity can be checked backwards after a successful recovery of the key KAB. Note that a denial of service by a corruption of this message is possible here (A and B will not be able to establish shared key). However, if an attacker is able to modify the original transmission and to insert his modified message, he can achieve the same goal only by garbling anyway. Integrity of the message in step 8 is protected with the key KAB, with implications same as for step 6.
Evolution of attack strategies
The described concept does not need to generate complete attack strategies starting from very basic rules. In the simplest case, new attack strategies are generated only as a recombination of already existing generic elementary attacks (e.g, replay a message, change the IP address in a packet header, capture a node).
EAs are searching only for a sequence of such elementary attacks that together lead successful attack. If we give more freedom to EAs by increasing the granularity of rules, which means we decompose the generic attacks into more elementary rules (e.g., modification of X-th bit of message regardless of the structure of message), we get more possibilities.
Results range from improvements of existing attacks by optimization of their parameters up to finding completely novel attacks. Note that the transition between recombination-only and novel attacks is not discrete as it depends on the granularity of the elementary attacks we are using, and the level of freedom we allow is often relative to the solved problem.
Re-combination of the existing attacks
Generic attacks are written as a sequence of elementary rules and EAs create combination only at a generic attack level, not on the rules level. Pre-specified generic attacks also serve
Evolution of attack strategies
As an significant evolution speed-up as it is not necessary for evolution to develop known attacks from scratch. Example generic attacks can be replay, reflection or interleave message attacks, forged IP 192.168.l.l addresses in a packet header, forged ARP packets, captured packets in a promiscuous mode or claim fake identity. Generic attacks alone may or may not be a successful attack strategy alone. E.g., if the target of an attacker is DoS for a selected computer, then a forged ARP packet alone is often sufficient. In the case of data traffic exposure, it must be combined with a subsequent packet capture of the redirected traffic.
Improvement (optimization) of known attack strategy
In this case, a particular attacker’s strategy is known in advance (e.g., capture and extract keys from some nodes and use them to compromise communication), we are only optimizing parameters of the strategy (e.g., which particular nodes should be captured). This is the most common usage of EAs in other domains – as a tool for parameter optimization. This approach is suitable when we know some parameterizable tradeoff based attack and we like to obtain better attacker success than with existing parameters. Alternatively, basic principle of attack is known but actual parameters must be set according to (complex) relations of actual environment (e.g., particular network deployment and type of applied secrecy amplification protocol).
Finding novel attack strategies
If we focus on the granularity of elementary rules, we can extend the re-combination approach to find novel attacks mechanism. If we do not restrict ourselves only to known attacks and their parameters, but introduce more general rules describing what else might an attacker be able to observe and manipulate inside the system, EAs might be able to evolve a completely novel attack.
However, as the additional rules also increase the search space, the evolution progress will often be slower than in previous cases and with an uncertain outcome. But the ability of EAs to come up with unique solutions is beyond human capabilities as was demonstrated in the area of hardware circuits and may lead to novel attack strategies difficult to be conceived by a human expert.
Not all areas have the same potential for automatic search within the described concept. Systems with straightforward and accurate fitness functions (like the fraction of compromised messages) are generally more suitable. EAs typically works well within systems with complex relations depending on multiple input variables, where the fitness landscape1 is not discrete but contains local minimums and maximums with gradual transition. In case of attack strategies, it is important to have a gradual decrease in security after an attack instead of Virtual hyper plane of fitness values for all possible points inside search space.
only “0% or 100% compromised”. In discrete cases, EAs are just as effective as random search (might be still useful under some circumstances). Particularly suitable are the environments with already existing partial compromise due to security/resources tradeoff that can be unbalanced by a better attack strategy like is the case of wireless sensor networks.
We expect that recombination and optimization of known attacks will provide the most useful results. But different “way of thinking” of EAs may lead to unexpected and surprising discoveries of novel attacks. Here, the success rate will be highly dependent on the proper choice of the elementary rules used to build up the attack strategy.
At the end restart your router. You can use a software restart – maintenance tab and click reboot. Alternatively, you can turn off the router on and off using the buttons on the back of the device. Be careful, however, to the small recessed button directly on the router. This returns the device to factory settings. To press it you need a paperclip or pencil tip. Subsequently Put on your laptop or other device and search for wireless networks by name, select the one you named a few steps. For connection will require a password (WEP, those 10 to 30 characters). Once you enter it, you will be able to connect without re-entering.